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Abstract 
What are the impacts of free trade agreement on the social welfare of different groups of labor 
force in a developed country?  What is the impact of free trade on a developed country’s income 
disparity?  What is the effect of free trade on the skill distribution of a developed country?  The 
objective of this paper is to address the above questions in a simple two-sector general-
equilibrium North-South trade model in which both countries produce one final good and one 
high-tech intermediate input. Horizontally differentiated skilled workers produce the high-tech 
intermediate input. The final good is produced with the use of a high-tech intermediate input and 
unskilled labor.  Each country is populated by a continuum of unskilled workers with differential 
potential ability.  Workers in the North and South can acquire skill by investment in training or 
education.  Thus, skill distribution in the North and South is determined endogenously in the 
model through a self-selection.  I characterize two different types of equilibrium: a closed-
economy equilibrium without trade and free trade equilibrium. Then, I investigate the impact of 
free trade, in the presence of training costs, on the skill distribution within each country, income 
disparity, and social welfare. 
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 1. Introduction 
   Several studies have indicated that income disparity in the U.S. as well as other 
developed nations has been rising during the past two decades.1 This materialized in a dramatic 
decrease in the real wage of low skilled labor as well as an increase in the wage of highly skilled 
labor.  Specifically, Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (1991) found for the U.S. that the 1990's wage of 
the lowest 20% of the American workforce had fallen by 25% below the 1973 real wage.  Also 
Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) found that between 1963 and 1989, a real average weekly wage 
for the least skilled workers decreased by 5%, where the same for skilled workers increased by 
40%.2  Furthermore, Machin (1996) showed that income inequality has been rising in the UK 
within group as well as between group during 1978-92.  He suggested that within-group 
inequality in hourly income increased by 23% over the same period.3  This rise in inequality has 
been the result of a relative wage growth in the top of the wage distribution and a fall in the 
bottom of the wage distribution. On the other hand, Cawley, Heckman, and Vytiacil (1998) 
showed that potential ability is correlated with the wage.  This was shown especially in the case 
of white-collar workers.  Furthermore, they showed that a significant portion of the rise in 
within-group inequality is unexplained by age and education.  Hoxby and Terry (1999) 
decomposed the growing dispersion into three sources.  The first is increasing diversity of people 
attending college.  The second is an increasing return to aptitude.  The third is the increasing 
correlation between the average aptitude of a college’s student and its expenditure on education.   
                                                 
1 For general trends supporting this see Murphy and Welch (1993). 
2 See Richardson (1995) for a survey of the impact of trade on U.S. wage inequalities. 
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 Similar trends have been observed in Canada see Beaudry and Green (1999). 
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The growing number of free trade agreement, trade liberalization and increased 
globalization together with above trends in income disparities the raises some important 
questions concerning the their impacts on each country’s labor market.   A lively debate on 
whether free trade between developed and less-developed countries has detrimental effect on the 
welfare of the unskilled workers in a developed nation.  Leamer (1993) and Wood (1995) 
suggested that the decreasing of the welfare of the unskilled workers in the developed nation is 
caused preliminary by the expansion of trade with the LDC.  This is because of the link between 
the developed country’s labor market and those of the LDC’s, which resulted in a decline of the 
wage of the North’s unskilled labor and a rise in the wage of the South’s unskilled workers.  
Thus, leading to a change in the distribution of skill in both markets as well as income 
disparities.  On the other hand, Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) among others, argue that trade is 
not a major factor in determining income disparity.  In spite of this disagreement on the impact 
of free trade on income disparity there is a need for an approach that can analyze this issue in a 
general equilibrium model of a North-South trade in which the distribution of skill is 
endogenous.  Furthermore, there is a need for a model that explains the opposition of free trade 
agreement by some groups in developed countries.4 
One approach to analyze the impact of free trade on income disparities is within the 
framework of a two-sector Heckscher-Ohlin type model.  In this case the developed country 
would have comparative advantage in the production of the skill-intensive good.  Thus, the 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem would apply resulting in a reduction in the relative price of the less 
skill-intensive good and as a result of trade decreasing the return to the less skilled labor and the 
                                                 
4
 Fisher and Serra (1996) presented a model that analyzes the opposition of developed country to free trade but with 
exogenous skill distribution. 
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rise in the skilled wage in the developed country.5  However, in this framework, nothing can be 
said about within the skill group inequality and the impact of free trade on the distribution of 
skill in the economy.  Abdel-Rahman, Norman, and Wang (2002) introduced a model that can 
explain the impacts of free trade on income disparities within-skill group and between skilled 
and unskilled labor.  The model utilizes a matching between horizontally differentiated skilled 
worker in the North and the firm producing a high-tech good.  The wage of the skilled labor is 
determined by a symmetric Nash bargain, while the wage of the unskilled labor is determined 
competitively. However, in that model, labor supply of both skilled and unskilled labor is fixed.  
Thus, the model does not take into consideration the impact of free trade on the distribution of 
skill in each country.  Furthermore, it was assumed that the less developed county is only 
populated with unskilled labor.  Thus, the high-tech good is produced only in the developed 
country, which is not a realistic assumption.   As a result of that, the model predicted that free 
trade would result in a decrease in income disparities within the skilled labor force in the 
developed country, which is not consistent with most empirical finding.6  Furthermore, no 
income disparity exists in the less developed country, since it is only populated with unskilled 
labor.  Another related work is by Fisher and Serra (1996) where they presented a model that 
justifies the opposition of developed country to free trade by adopting the a majority voting 
approach in a model in which each agent is endowed with skill and unskilled labor and agent 
consume a differentiated product.  However in their model skill distribution is given exogenously 
and therefore the impact of free trade on skill distribution cannot be analyzed.  Furthermore due 
                                                 
5
 Matusz (1996) analyzed the impact of free trade on a monopolistically competitive good market and in an 
efficiency wage labor market model. On the other hand, Abdel-Rahman, Norman, and Wang (2001) analyzed the 
impact of a free trade on a two-sector model where the labor market is characterized by a horizontal matching of 
skilled workers in the North using a symmetric Nash bargain model.  However, in the Abdel-Rahman, Norman, and 
Wang model, the skill distribution is given exogenously, and thus the impact of free trade on the distribution of skill 
is ignored. 
6 See Jones and Neary for a survey (1984). 
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to the exogenous skill distribution income disparity is proportional to the initial skill distribution 
before and after trade.  
Thus, there is a need for a model that can explain the impact of free trade on skill 
distribution, income disparities within-skill group as well as between skill and unskilled groups, 
and welfare of different group of labor in the developed as well as in the less developed country.  
This paper will extend previous work in four directions: first by introducing training and 
horizontal differentiation in potential ability into the model and thus making the choice of 
acquiring skill endogenous through a self-selection process, second, by making both the skilled 
labor market as well as the unskilled labor markets competitive, and third, by examining the 
impact of free trade on both the developed and the less developed country’s labor markets, forth, 
by examining the impact of free trade agreement on varies groups of labor force in the developed 
country.   
 The objective of this paper is to address some of the issues related to a free trade 
agreement: skill distribution, income disparities, and welfare.  More precisely, the paper 
addresses the following questions: What is the impact of free trade on the wage inequality of 
each country?   What are the impact of free trade on the welfare of different groups of labor force 
in developed and developing countries?   This paper addresses the above questions in a simple 
two-sector North-South trade general equilibrium model. The model investigates the impact of a 
free trade agreement on the skill distribution of a competitive labor market, in the presence of 
training costs.   In this model the North and the South produce one final manufacturing good and 
one high-tech intermediate input. The final good is produced with the use of a high-tech 
intermediate input and unskilled labor, while horizontally differentiated skilled workers produce 
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the high-tech intermediate input.7 Each country is populated by a continuum of unskilled workers 
with differential potential ability.  Workers in the North and South can acquire skill by 
investment in training or education.  This potential ability translates into productivity in the 
production of the high-tech intermediate input if workers acquire training.  On the other hand, if 
workers do not acquire training, they have constant productivity regardless of their potential 
ability.  Thus, potential ability causes labor to differ in productivity only when they acquire 
education and produce the high-tech intermediate input.   In the context of the model, skill 
distribution in the North and South is determined endogenously in the model through a self-
selection. Furthermore, through the determination of wages in competitive markets, income 
disparity is determined endogenously.  The model characterizes equilibrium without trade and 
free trade equilibrium. The model generates income disparity within the skilled worker as well as 
between skilled and unskilled unlike versions of Heckscher-Ohlin model.  Then, I investigated 
the impact of free trade, in the presence of training costs, on the skill distribution within each 
country, on income disparity and social welfare.  
 The main findings of the paper are as follows:  First I show that free trade would lead to 
complete specialization in the South but may not lead to complete specialization in the North.  
This is unlike the outcome from Heckscher-Ohlin type model, where we have complete 
specialization.  The reason for that is that if the North completely specializes in the production of 
the high-tech intermediate input workers with them lowest potential ability would end up with 
negative income after paying for training cost.  But if the South completely specialized in the 
production of the final good all worker will have the same positive productivity.  Second, the 
wage rate will be equalized between the North and the South in equilibrium for the unskilled 
workers but not for the skilled workers.  This will result in a lower wage for the unskilled in the 
                                                 
7For a review of models of trade based on differences in technology see Jones and Neary (1984).  
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North and higher unskilled wage in the South.  As a result of that, I showed that free trade result 
in higher income disparity within the skilled group as well as between skilled and unskilled in 
the North.  The opposite will happen in the South.  Third, I showed that free trade would result in 
hire diversity within the skilled workers in the North, which is new to the literature.8  This is 
because free trade would induce worker in the North to acquire training.  Forth, I showed that 
free trade would increase the mass of the skilled worker in the North and would decrease it in the 
South. Finally, I sowed that free trade would decrease the welfare of the unskilled workers and 
will increase the welfare of the workers who are skilled before and after trade, as would be 
expected from H-O type model.  While the welfare change of the workers who are unskilled 
before trade and acquire skill after is ambiguous, which is new to the literature.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 presents the assumptions and the 
specifications of the North-South trade model.  Section 3 develops the equilibrium under autarky 
and establishes the existence of the equilibrium.  Section 4 investigates the determinants of 
income disparities within group as well as between groups and its impact on social welfare.  
Section 5, characterizes a free trade equilibrium.  Section 6 analyses the impact of free trade on 
the welfare of different types of workers.  Finally, Section 7 contains the conclusions. 
2. The Model 
 We consider a world with two countries: the highly developed North and a less developed 
South, indexed by i= N, S respectively.  Each country is populated with a fixed number of 
consumers/workers (to be described below) where each is endowed with one unit of labor.  
Furthermore, all consumers are identical in every aspect except for their potential ability and 
each has a utility as a function of the only consumption good X in the economy. Both countries 
                                                 
8
 This trend has been documented by Hoxby and Terry (1999). 
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produce homogeneous final good, X, according to a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb Douglas 
production function given by 
ββ −= 1iii ZLX     (1) 
where Li is the quantity of unskilled workers and Zi is the quantity of a high-tech intermediate 
input, and )1,0(∈β . The behavior of a given firm in this industry is characterized by the 
following: 
{ })1(max , iiiiiiZL ZLWXPii −−=π  
where the price of Z is normalized to be one.  The first order conditions of the above problem are 
given by 
iiii LWXP =β     (2) 
( ) iii ZXP =− β1    (3) 
From (2) and (3) we have 
    ( ) iii LWZ =− β
β
1
  (4) 
 It is assumed that the total population of a given country i is given by Mi.   Workers in 
both countries are identical in terms of productivity and each worker is endowed with one unit of 
labor.  However, workers are heterogeneous in their potential ability if employed in the high-tech 
intermediate input industry, Z.  This potential ability can be realized if labor acquires training or 
education.  The productivity of a worker with potential ability ]1,0[∈δ , in country if 
he acquires training, in terms of good Z is given by 
},{ SNi∈
( ) δαδ iiZ =   (5) 
where iα is positive constant.  Thus, (5) indicates that the high-tech intermediate input can be 
produced with a continuum of constant returns to scale technology.  Furthermore, without loss of 
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generality it is assumed that SN αα > .  Thus, each worker with potential abilityδ  in the North is 
more productive in the high-tech intermediate input than the South.  This can be further 
interpreted with the Ricardian view that trade will be a result of difference in technology 
between countries.9  With this view, the North is having access to more productive technology 
than the South in the high-tech intermediate input.  Workers of type δ  are uniformly distributed 
on a unit interval such that ]1,0[)( ∈∀= δδ iMiM .  Figure 1 provides a graphical description for 
the potential ability profile.  The potential ability of worker type 0=δ is zero while the potential 
ability of worker type 1=δ  is α as indicated by Figure 1.  The mass of workers can be written 
as,  , where ∫=
1
0
)( δδ dMM ii ]1,0[)( ∈∀= δδ iM
i
iM .  Labor can acquire training in a given 
country by investing ti   in terms of the intermediate input Z.10 It can be seen from (5) that the 
worker with the highest productivity, α ,  (after acquiring training) is the worker with the 
highest potential ability 1=δ .  This can be interpreted as if firms in industry Z have job 
requirements that perfectly match the potential ability of workers of type 1=δ .  On the other 
hand, a worker with potential ability 0=δ  has the poorest match with the skill requirements by 
industry Z.  Thus, it is assumed that the worker with potential ability 0=δ cannot produce the 
intermediate input even if he acquires training.  Given the above specification, the total output of 
good Zi is given as 
∫1
ui
dii
δ
δδα= MZi
                                                 
  (6) 
9 The result of the model would not be affected if training were a function of the potential ability.  However, a close 
form solution will not be possible (see Appendix A.2, for a simple training cost function). 
10 Another way of interpreting the potential ability equation and the training cost is given in Appendix A.3. 
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Where Uiδ  is the measure of untrained labor, as depicted in Figure 1, to be determined below.   
The marginal worker who will be indifferent to acquiring skill determines this measure of 
untrained labor or not.  Thus, the marginal worker, Uiδ , is the one for which the wage offered to 
him by industry Z is equal to his opportunity cost, W , where W is the equilibrium wage of 
the untrained worker, to be determined below.  Thus, the marginal worker can be determined as 
it+i* *i
[ ] 1* −+= iii tWui αδ          (7) 
Consequently, the measure of trained labor in the intermediate good industry Zi is )1( Uiδ− .11  It 
is assumed that wages will be determined competitively for skilled and unskilled workers.  
Furthermore, without loss of generality it is assumed that t .  This can be viewed also as a 
difference in the training technology.  Thus, the potential ability in the North is higher than in the 
South while the training cost is lower.    
NS t>
3. Autarky Equilibrium 
 Under autarky, each country has to produce the high-tech intermediate good as well as 
the final good.  Thus, given { }},{),1,0(0;),(,)(,, ***** SNiUWWP iUiiii ∈∈∀> δδδδ  we say that an 
autarky equilibrium defined by{ }},{),1,0(;),(,)(,, ***** SNiUWWP iUiiii ∈∈δδδδ
},{ SNi∈
would result in 
the following conditions: profit maximization for firms in the final good and the intermediate 
good sectors; firms making zero profit in both sectors; equality of supply and demand in the 
labor markets and the intermediate good market; and the marginal worker will be indifferent to 
acquiring training or not.  Now let us suppose that equilibrium exists.  Then the aggregate supply 
of unskilled labor in country is given by 
 
                                                 
11 See the appendix for the proof. 
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( )[ ] 1−+== iiiiiUiix tWMML αδ   (8) 
In addition, the aggregate supply of intermediate input in country i },{ SN∈ is given as 
(



 −−= ∫1 1
iU
iUiiii tdMZ
δ
δδδα )           (9) 
where the first term between parentheses on the RHS of (9) is the total output and the second 
term on the RHS is the training cost.  Integrating the above equation we have 
( ) ( UiiUiii tZ δδ )α −−−= 112 2  
Substituting (7) into the above equation, we have 
( )[ ] (10) 22
2 iiii
i
i Wt
M
Z −−= αα
Equating the aggregate supply and demand by substituting (8) and (10) into (4) we have 
    ( ) ( ) 






 −−−−=
22 2
12 iiiii
Wtt β
βαβ
βW  (11) 
The above quadratic equation has two roots; the relevant one (i.e., positive root) determines the 
equilibrium wage as12 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )β
ββαββ
−
−−+−+−−=
2
211 222* iiii
i
ttt
W        (12) 
From the above equation, it can be seen that the W* is positive as long as ii t≠α .  Thus, we 
impose the following regularity condition 
Assumption 1.   ii t>α    { }NSi ,∈  
                                                 
12 Katz and Autor (200) indicated that within-group inequality accounts for substantial fraction of overall earned 
income inequality. 
 11
The above assumption implies that, in each country, there exists at least some type of worker that 
will have positive wage in industry Z net of training cost.  Note that if the above assumption is 
not satisfied in a given country, i, no worker will acquire training.  Straightforward 
differentiation of the above equation would lead to the following result: 
Result 1 Given Assumption 1, the equilibrium wage for the unskilled workers, Wi*, is increasing 
in α  and β and decreasing in t. 
The intuition behind the above result is that an increase in α  would increase the supply of 
trained workers.  This is because it will increase the incentive for workers to acquire training and 
consequently will decrease the supply of untrained workers.  This would increase the wage of 
unskilled labor.   On the other hand, an increase in t would lower the incentive to acquire 
training, which would increase the supply of unskilled labor.  This would decrease the wage rate 
of unskilled workers.  Finally, an increase in β  would increase the demand for unskilled 
workers, L, and thus would increase the wage of the unskilled labor.  Recall the assumption that 
SN αα >  and t , we can conclude that the unskilled worker’s equilibrium wage in the 
North will be higher that in the South.  From the above specification of the model, we now 
obtain the following: 
NS t>
Theorem 1.  Given Assumption 1, there exist unique that result in autarky equilibrium 
{ }},{),1,0(;),(,)(,, ***** SNiUWWP iUiiii ∈∈δδδδ , such that . },{),1,0(0)(,)(,, **** SNiUWWP iiiii ∈∈∀> δδδ
Proof. First, I show that for equilibrium to exist we must have .  This follows from 
the specification of the final good production function.  It can be seen from Figure 1 that if 
, then no worker will acquire training.  Thus, the high-tech intermediate input will 
not be produced and the final good production will not be feasible, as can be seen from (1).  
*
iii Wt >−α
*
iii Wt ≤−α
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Hence, utility will be zero, which contradicts the initial primes.13   Thus, for autarky equilibrium 
to exist we must have .  Second, by substituting (12) into this condition and 
rearranging terms, we have the above condition satisfied as long as 
*
iii Wt >−α
ii t>α  
α
δ
 Observe that the equilibrium skill distribution in this model is socially optimal.  This is 
obvious since; market failure doesn’t exist in the specification above.14  Now we can characterize 
the equilibrium parameter space under autarky as in Figure 2.  The area above the line tt =)(α  is 
the parameter set where equilibrium will exist, given Assumption1.  Observe that for a given 
point like a in Figure 2, where the values of tN and N would result in equilibrium in the North, we 
have an area, given by the triangle abc in figure 2, of parameter values in which equilibrium will 
exist in the South. 
Next we examine the impact of the parameters on the equilibrium amount of untrained 
workers.  Totally differentiating 8 with respect to in β , t, and , with the use of Result 1, 
would lead to the following: 
Result 3. The equilibrium amount of unskilled labor, under autarky 
(i) is increasing in β  and t 
(ii) is decreasing inα  . 
(ii) is independent of the total population of the economy.  
The intuition behind this result is that higher β  would result in higher demand for the unskilled 
labor and thus higher wage for the unskilled workers, which would result in a larger amount of 
untrained labor.  Both  and t affect Ui  directly and indirectly through W
* as can be seen from 
(7). However, the direct effect dominates the indirect effect in both cases.  Next, a higher cost of 
                                                 
13
 Note that equilibrium exists even though utility is zero, but we only restrict ourselves to positive equilibrium. 
14 See the Appendix, A.4, for the proof of this result. 
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training, t, would decrease the incentive for labor to train and thus increase the mass of untrained 
workers. On the other hand, higherα leads to a higher wage for the trained labor but also a 
higher demand for unskilled labor and higher wages for the untrained labor.  Thus, from Result 3 
and given the assumption that SN αα >  and , we can conclude that the mass of skilled 
workers in the North is larger than the mass of skilled workers in the South, which is intuitively 
appealing. 
NS tt >
Now substituting (12) into (10) we can derive the equilibrium amount of the intermediate 
good.  Totally differentiating the equation and utilizing Result 1 would yield the following: 
Result 2. The equilibrium amounts of intermediate input Zi*, under autarky, is increasing inα  
and decreasing in t and β . 
The intuition behind the above result is that an increase in the potential ability of workers or a 
decrease in the training cost would affect Z in two ways.  It will affect Z directly or indirectly 
through .   However, both the direct and the indirect effects of *iUδ α and t are in the same.  First, 
an increase in the potential ability of workers would increase the productivity and consequently 
the output of industry Z.  On the other hand, an increase in the training cost would decrease the 
mass of skilled workers and thus the equilibrium output of industry Z.  Finally, an increase in β  
would increase the wage of unskilled workers leading to a decrease in the mass of skilled 
workers and thus the equilibrium output of industry Z. 
Finally, the equilibrium price of good X in a given country can be derived by substituting 
(2) and (3) into (1) as  
( )βββ ββ *)1(* )1( ii WP −−− −=                     (13) 
Totally differentiating the above equation with the use of  (12), we can conclude the following:  
Result 4. The price of the final good, X, under autarky is increasing in α and decreasing in t.  
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The reason for the above result is that P* is increasing in W*, which is increasing in α  and 
decreasing in t.  Given the assumptions imposed on the parameters t and α , the above result 
implies that the price of the final good is higher in the North, PN >PS.  This result will be used in 
the following section to derive the pattern of trade under trade equilibrium. 
4. Income Inequalities and Social Welfare 
 In general, there are several ways to measure income disparities.   In this paper I focus on 
earned wage inequality.  Thus, I define two measures of income disparities; the fist is a measure 
of disparity between skilled and unskilled workers in a given country, the second is a measure of 
income disparity within the skilled workers in a given country.  Let us consider first income 
disparity within the skilled group.  I defined this measure as the difference between the highest 
wage of the highest skilled worker and the wage of the lowest skilled worker, which is given by 
.  But since in equilibrium the skill distribution is determined endogenously 
within the model by the equality of the wages of skilled and unskilled workers for the marginal 
worker, this measure will be given by   
)1( *iUii
WID δα −=
*
iiii
W WtID −−=α    (14) 
Observe that this measure define the disparity within the skilled worker and could be used also as 
a measure of disparity between the skilled and unskilled workers in a given country.  Totally 
differentiating the above equation with the use of  (12) and Result 1, we can conclude the 
following:  
Result 5. Income disparity within-skilled group, in a given country, is decreasing in t and β and 
increasing inα . 
The intuition behind the above result is that an increase in α  or a decrease in t would affect 
income disparity in two opposite directions.   First, it would decrease income disparity indirectly, 
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through the equilibrium wage of the unskilled workers.  Second, it would increase income 
disparity through the direct effect on ID.   However, the direct effect dominates the indirect 
effect.  Intuitively an increase in α  and a decrease in t would increase the net income of the most 
productive skilled worker, which increases income disparity. The impact of   on the income 
inequality is only through the equilibrium wage.  This is also intuitive since it would increase the 
wage of the unskilled labor, which results in lower income disparity. Thus, given the assumption 
that SN αα >  and , disparity in the North is higher than in the South under autarky.  NS tt >
=
BID
Now let us consider a measure of income disparity between the skilled and unskilled 
which is defined as difference between the average income of skilled workers net of training cost 
o and that of unskilled workers and the wage of unskilled worker.  First we define the average 
income of the skilled workers as  


 −−− ∫− )1()1( 11 iiiiiiAve tdI
iU
δδαδδ δ  
Integrating the above equation and rearranging terms we have 
2
*
iii
iAve
tWI −+= α  
Observe that the average income of skilled worker is increasing in the equilibrium wage of the 
unskilled workers. This is intuitive since increasing the wage of the unskilled workers would 
decrease the incentive of unskilled worker to acquire skill and thus decreasing the supply of 
skilled workers and thus increase the average wage.  The measure of income disparity is  
*
*
2 i
iii
i
W
tW −+= α   (15) 
Totally differentiating the above equation with the use of  (15) and Result 1, we can conclude the 
following:  
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Result 6. Income disparity between groups, in a given country under autarky, is decreasing in t 
and increasing in α and β . 
Observe that from Result 5 and 6 that both measures of income disparities behave the same in t 
and α  but not in β .  The reason for that is that the average wage of the skilled group is 
increasing in β . 
Let us define the social welfare function by uniformly aggregating all workers’ 
equilibrium utility. It is assumed that the individual utility is linear in the only consumption good 
X. Thus, integrating the consumer income and deflating it with the price of the final good, we 
can derive the social welfare as  


 −−+= ∫− )1(1*** 1 iiiiiiUiii tdWMP
Ui
δδδαδω δ  
Integrating the above equation we can derive the social welfare as  
( )







 −−+


 += −
i
iii
i
ii
iiii
WttWWWBM α
α
αω
β
2
2*2*
** )(   (16) 
The first term between brackets is the income of the unskilled worker while the second term is 
the net income of the skilled worker.  It can be seen that the welfare of the unskilled workers is 
increasing in W* while the welfare of the skilled worker is decreasing in W*.  Furthermore, it is 
worth noting that the equilibrium in this model is a first best socially optimal.  In other words, a 
central planner that maximizes the social welfare function would choose the mass of skilled 
worker identical to the equilibrium outcome.  This should be obvious since there is no source of 
market failure in the model.  Now from the first term in (16) we have the following result. 
Result 7. The Social welfare is increasing in α  and decreasing in t. 
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It can be seen that both parameters affect social welfare directly and indirectly through the wage.  
But since as indicated above that the derivativeω  of with respect to W evaluated at  is zero, 
the direct effect is the relevant one on 
*
iUδ
ω .  Observe that an increase in α  would increase 
productivity and thus it is intuitive to increase social welfare.  Also an increase in t would 
decrease resources devoted to non-consumption and consequently would decrease social welfare.  
Thus, the above result follows directly from differentiatingω  with respect to α and t.  Now let us 
characterize the relationship between income disparity and equilibrium utility of unskilled 
workers.  From Result 6 and 7 we can conclude the following: 
Result 8.  An increase  
 (i) in α  increases income disparity and increases the social welfare. 
(ii) in t reduces income disparity and reduces the social welfare. 
Note that α  and t affect both types of income disparity in the same way.  Furthermore, from the 
above Result and given the assumption on the parameters, it can be seen that the North will have 
higher income disparity and higher social welfare compared to the South under autarchy.  
5. Trade Equilibrium 
 Now let us consider an integrated North-South world economy in which we have free 
trade and no labor mobility.  In the absence of friction or transportation cost, trade will result in 
price parity for the final good X such that PPP SN == .  Given the parameters of the model, the 
price of the final good is higher in the North as can be seen from Result 7.  Thus, the pattern of 
trade will be for the North to import the final good in return for exporting the high-tech 
intermediate input.   As a result of that the unskilled worker wage will be equalized between both 
countries.  Thus, wage disparity between unskilled labor in the North and South will vanish.   
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Given  we define a trade equilibrium by iiiii UWWP δδδ ∀> 0)(,)(,, ********
{ }},{),1,0(;),(, ***** SNiU iUi ∈∈δδδ)(,, ***** WWP iδ  which results in the following conditions: 
profit maximization for firms in the final good and the intermediate good sectors; firms making 
zero profit in both sectors; equality of supply and demand in the labor markets for each country; 
and the demand of the intermediate good by both countries to supply.  From the above 
specification of the model, we now obtain the following: 
Theorem 2.  Given Assumption1, there exists unique free trade equilibrium 
{ }},{),1,0(;),(,)(,, ********** SNiUWWP iUii ∈∈δδδδ , such that . iiiii UWWP δδδ ∀> 0)(,)(,, ********
Proof. The material balance condition is given by equating the aggregate supply and the 
aggregate demand in both countries as 
( )∑ ∑=−
i
iii ZLWβ
β1    (17) 
Substituting (8), (10), and (12) into (17) we have 
( ) ( )[ ]  (18) ∑ ∑ −−= +− i i iiiiii iiii WtMtWMW 2221 αααββ
From  (17) and without loss of generality assume that both countries are of the same size, MS 
=MN and that tttand NNNS θθγαγαα ==== where 1, ≤γθ we have 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )



 +−−−−=−−+


 +−
γαβ
β
γα
γα
α
θα
α
θ
β
β tWWWttWtWW SSS
N
iN
N
1
22
1 2
222
     (19) 
Equation (19) is a quadratic with two roots.  The relevant one (i.e., positive root) determines the 
equilibrium wage as 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( )( )γβ
θγθαγγγαγββθγβθγβ
+−
+++−++−++−++−−=
12
1)1(2)1(1221111 222222** ttttW
Thus, there exists a unique equilibrium wage for the unskilled workers 
 19
It can be seen that the wage rate will be equalized in equilibrium for the unskilled workers, 
Samuelson (1945).  However, the wage will not be equalized for the skilled workers of a given 
type between both countries.  The reason is that a worker of a given type in both countries has 
different potential ability.  Thus, when they acquire training, they will end up with different 
productivity.  
Now observe that if both countries are the same in every, then the wage of the unskilled 
workers after and before trade is the same.   But if 0/0 >> θγ orand  then the wage after 
trade of the unskilled worker in the North will be smaller than before trade.  In other words, one 
of the above parameter is sufficient to represent a difference between both countries.  Thus, 
smaller value of one of these parameters, indicates larger the difference between the North and 
South in terms of training technology and potential ability.  In addition, smaller value ofθ or 
larger value of γ would result in smaller difference between before and after trade wage of the 
unskilled workers in the North. As a result of that, we can conclude as follows: 
Result 9.  In a free trade equilibrium, there exist a set of parameters such that: 
            (i) . The North and the South will produce both the high-tech and the )1,0()1,0( **** ∈∈ SN and δδ
             final good.  
            (ii) .  The North will produce the final good as well as the high-tech 1)1,0( **** =∈ SN and δδ
           intermediate input while the South will completely specialize in the production of the final good. 
The above result follows from equation (7) and from the fact that wage rate equalization of the 
untrained workers between the North and the South under free trade equilibrium would decrease 
the North’s equilibrium wage and increase the South’s equilibrium wage.   The result indicates 
that free trade would increase the mass of skilled workers in the North, which has been 
documented by Machin (1996).  Thus, free trade will induce acquisition of human capital in the 
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North.  However, the opposite will accrue in the South.  In other words, skilled workers in the 
South will be better off working in the final good industry and earning unskilled wage than 
working in the production of the high-tech intermediate input.   It is interesting to note that the 
South can completely specialize in the production of the final good if W , where Wt−= γα** ** is 
given by (19).  However, the North will never completely specialize in the production of the 
high-tech intermediate input.   The reason for that is the worker with the lowest potential ability 
will never have an incentive to acquire training.  This result is new to this literature and is 
different from the conventional two-sector Heckscher-Ohlin model in which free trade would 
result in complete specialization in both countries.  Turning to the impact of free trade on income 
disparity.  Given both measures of income disparity within group (14) and between groups (15), 
we can conclude the following: 
Result 10.  Free trade would result in higher income disparity within the skilled group and 
between skilled and unskilled groups in the North and the opposite will occur in the South. 
The above result follows from the wage rate equalization of the unskilled workers in both 
countries and from the fact that the wage of the skilled workers will not be affected by free trade. 
The reason that the skilled worker’s wage will not be affected as a result of free trade is the 
different potential ability profile and the choice of numeraire.  This implies that workers are 
different among countries, since each country has a different potential ability profile and, 
consequently, a different productivity profile.  The above result is consistent with the finding of 
Hoxby and Terry (1999).  The decline of income disparity in the South has been supported for 
some developing countries in East Asia, Wood (1995).  On the other hand, widening income 
disparities between skilled and unskilled have been supported in the North by Wood (1995), 
Katz and Murphy (1992), and Bound and Johnson (1992) among others.  The rise in income 
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disparities within the skilled group in the North has been documented by Machin (1996) and 
Katz and Autor (2000). This result is different from Abdel-Rahman, Norman, and Wang (2002) 
due to the fixed supply of skilled and unskilled workers in their model.  We can also conclude 
from Result 9 and 10 we can conclude, that widening income disparity within the skilled group 
in the North is due to the increase in the diversity of skilled workers, which has been supported 
by Hoxby and Terry (1999).   
6.Welfare and Free Trade  
As we have seen that free trade will change the distribution of skill as well as income 
distribution in both countries.  Now, let us examine the impact of free trade on the welfare of 
different types of workers in the North.15  With the use of equation (16), lets us define the change 
in welfare for a given worker of type δ  in the North as  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

>−−
≤−=−≡∆ −−
−−
*****
**1*1**
***
}{
}{
UN
UN
NNN WWtB
WWB
δδθαδ
δδδωδωδω ββ
ββ
 
Observe that for and given that since W**Uδδ ≤ *** W≤ , then 0<∆ω .  On the other hand, for 
and given that W , thus we can conclude that **Uδδ > *** W≤ 0>∆ω .  Thus we have the 
following result 
Result 11. The North’s welfare of the workers  
(i) who are unskilled before and after trade will decrease with free trade. 
(ii) who are skilled before and after trader will increase with free trade. 
The intuition of the above result is as follows; free trade would affect the welfare of the 
untrained worker in the North in two ways; first it would decrease their wage and thus decrease 
utility and second it would decrease the price of the consumption good X which increases utility, 
                                                 
15
 The impact of free trade on the South will be the opposite of the North. 
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however the first effect dominates the second, resulting in a decrease in their welfare.  On the 
other hand, recall that due to the choice of the numeraire, the wage of the skilled workers will not 
be affected by free trade.  Thus, the welfare of a trained worker in the North would improve 
under free trade because of the decline in the price of the consumption good X.   
Now let us examine the impact of free trade on the welfare of the workers who are 
unskilled before trade but acquire training as a result of free trade.  To do that let us define the 
change in the welfare of all workers who are unskilled before free trade but skilled after as 
( ) ββ δδδθαδω δ
δ
−− −−−=∆ ∫ 1(
*
**
****** )( WdtW UuCN
U
U
 
Integrating the above equation and rearranging terms we have 



 −−


 −=∆ −− ααω
ββ ****
***
** )1(
22
2
WWWWWWCN  
The first term on the RHS is the welfare after trade while the second term on the RHS is the 
welfare before trade.  As it can be seen from the above equation, free trade will affect the welfare 
of worker who will switch from being unskilled to being skilled in two ways; first there will be a 
reduction in the wage of the unskilled workers as can be seen from figure 3, and second there 
will a reduction in the price of the final good X.  Thus, there will be an income effect and a price 
effect.  From the above equation, it can be shown that  if the following condition is 
satisfied 
0<
≥∆ CNω
β




<
≥+ *
**
*
**
21
W
W
W
W     (20) 
Thus, the outcome of the above condition, the impact of free trade on this group, will depend on 
the relative wage before and after trade and on the parameter β  associated with the unskilled 
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workers in the production function of the final good X.  Given that if 1*
**
=
W
W this implies that 
the North and the South have the same potential ability profile and training cost.  On the other 
hand if both countries are different in either potential ability or training cost then 1*
**
<
W
W .  
Observe that the larger the difference between the North and the South the smaller is this ratio.  
Let us now characterize condition (20) graphically.  The by the line in Figure 4 represents the 
LHS of the condition (20) while the RHS is represented by one of the three curves depending 
each for different value of β .   For each one of the three curves there exists a value of *
**
W
W such 
that the LHS is equal the RHS.   Below that value the LHS is larger than the RHS and the 
opposite is true for values higher than *
**
W
W .  The value *
**
W
W at which the LHS is equal to the 
RHS is larger for higher value of β .     Thus we can conclude that the following 
β
β
γ
Result 12.  
(i) For a small value of , if the North and the South are similar, then the welfare of the 
workers who are unskilled before trade and skilled after trade in the North will decrease as a 
result of free trade. The opposite will accrue if the North and South are dissimilar. 
(ii) For a large value of , if the North and the South are similar, then the welfare of the 
workers who are unskilled before trade and skilled after trade in the North will increase as a 
result of free trade.  
Recall that the similarities and differences between the North and the South are represented by 
the values the parameters θand .  The intuition of the above result is that for a small value 
of β the price effect on welfare is weaker compared to the income effect.  In other words, the 
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reduction in income due to the switch from unskilled to skilled would decrease the welfare by 
more than the increase in welfare due to the reduction in the price of the final good.  On the other 
hand, for a large value of β the price effect is stronger than the income effect and the opposite 
impact on welfare will accrue.  It is interesting to note that even though both countries may be 
similar the welfare of the worker that will switch jobs in the North may increase or decrease 
depending on the parameter of the production function, which is accessible to both countries.   
This result sheds some lights on groups that may oppose free trade agreement in 
developed countries.  As it can be seen all of the unskilled labor workers in the developed 
country will oppose free trade agreement with countries that are not similar to their own. While 
all workers who are skilled before and after free trade agreement will be for free trade.  This 
result is similar to what can be expected from H-O type model.  However, workers who will 
switch jobs may be the decisive group on whether or not a country may accept a free trade 
agreement.  As we showed this group would favor free trade agreement with countries that are 
similar or not similar to their own country only if the technology is characterized by being highly 
unskilled labor intensive, high value of β .  On the other hand, the same group will be oppose to 
free trade with countries that are similar to their own if the technology of the final good is 
characterized by being intermediate input intensive, low value of β .  
Now let us consider a situation in which the decision on whether a rich country chooses 
free trade agreement or not is made by a majority vote approach like in Fisher and Serra 
(1996).16  In this framework workers will either vote for or against free trade.  Free trade will be 
chosen if the majority of worker’s welfare increase as a result of free trade Thus, the median 
voter in the North will determine the decision of whether to free trade will be accepted or not.    
                                                 
16
 The majority voting approach has been first adapted to this trade decision by Baldwin (1982) and Mayer (1984). 
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Theorem 3. The North will vote for free trade (against free trade) if ( )β
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it implies from (7) and (12) that *
2
1
NUδ≥ .  But this implies 
that the majority vote will be of workers who are skilled before and after trade.  Thus, from 
Result 11, the North will vote for free trade 
Theorem 4. Suppose that the only difference between the North and the South is potential ability 
and that ( )( ) )25.1(1
412
γββγ
γβγα
−−+
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then the North will vote against free trade. 
Proof. Observe that if ( )( ) )25.1(1
412
γββγ
γβγα
−−+
−+≤
t
this implies from (7) and W** that
2
1** ≥NUδ .  
But this implies that the majority vote will be of workers who are unskilled before and after 
trade.  Thus, from Result 11, the North will vote against free trade 
Theorem 5. Suppose that the only difference between the North and the South is potential ability 
and that ( ) ( )( ) )25.1(1
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then the North’s majority vote will be 
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this implies from (7), (12), and 
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2
1
NUNU δδ >> .  But this implies that the majority vote will be of workers who were 
unskilled before and skilled after trade.  Thus, from Result 12, the North’s decision will depend 
on ω∆  of which is undetermined *** NUNU δδ −
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Thus, we can conclude that there will be clear winners and clear losers under free trade.  
In addition there will be a group of workers who will acquire training as a result of free trade and 
their welfare is not determined.   Furthermore, as a result of free trade the North will pay some 
training costs, which has been observed.  The result provides in addition to the classical 
argument that only unskilled worker in developed country would oppose free trade agreement.  
The opposite will happen in the South.  However, since the South can completely specialize in 
the production of the final good, the South welfare would increase in this case.  In other words, 
there could be only winners if the South completely specializes.  This would justify the 
willingness of a LDC to enter into a free trade agreement with a developed one.17   
7. Conclusion  
This paper presented a North-South trade general-equilibrium model in which both 
countries produce a final good and a high-tech intermediate input.  Each country is populated by 
a continuum of unskilled workers with differential potential ability.  Workers in the North and 
South can acquire skill by investment in training or education.  Thus, skill distribution in the 
North and South is determined endogenously in the model through a self -selection.  The model 
analyzed the impact of a bilateral free trade agreement on income inequalities and social welfare 
of each country.  Furthermore, the model examined the impact of free trade on the distribution of 
skilled labor in each country.   
 It has been shown, in the context of the model, that free trade would lead to complete 
specialization in the South but may not lead to complete specialization in the North.  Second, the 
wage rate will be equalized in equilibrium for the to complete specialization.  The wage rate will 
be equalized in equilibrium for the unskilled workers but not for the skilled workers.  This would 
                                                 
17 See Fisher and Serra (1996) for a median vote with exogenous skill distribution model that generated similar 
result. 
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lead to lower wage for the unskilled in the North and higher wage for the unskilled in the South.  
As a result of that, it has been shown that free trade will result in higher income inequality within 
the skill group as well as between skill and unskilled in the North. Then, I showed that free trade 
would result in hire diversity within the skilled workers in the North, which is new to the 
literature.  This is because free trade would induce worker in the North to acquire training.  Thus, 
free trade would increase the mass of the skilled worker in the North and would decrease it in the 
South. Furthermore, free trade would result in higher welfare for the skilled workers in the North 
but lower welfare for the unskilled workers in the North.   In addition, it has been shown that 
even though both countries may be similar, as a result of free trade the welfare of the worker that 
will switch jobs from being unskilled to skilled, in the North, may increase or decrease 
depending on the parameter of the production function, which is accessible to both countries.  
Thus, the welfare change on the workers who are unskilled before trade and acquire skill after is 
ambiguous, which is new to the literature.   The opposite will happen in the South.  .   
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Appendix 
A.1.  Consider a closed economy producing two homogeneous goods (X and Z) with the use of 
labor. The total population of the economy is N. Good X represents a low-tech product that can 
be produced by skilled or unskilled workers, whereas good Z is a high-tech product that can be 
produced by skilled workers.   The production function of sector X is a simple CRS given by 
X=L.  Production efficiency implies that the firms in sector X will hire labor at the wage rate 
equal to their marginal product, P=W. 
 It is assumed that consumers/workers have an identical utility function.  The behavior of 
some representative households is given as 
{ }zPxWzxUzx +== − )1(,max ββ  
From the above behavior we can derive the aggregate demand for good X as 
( ) ( )



 −+−= ∫− 111
U
dtWMPAD Uz
δ
δαδδβ  
Equating the aggregate demand and the aggregate supply, , and with the use of W=P, we 
can derive W
∫1
U
d
δ
δαδ
* as in (11). 
A.2.  Suppose that the training cost is given by a linear function of the potential ability as 
δτ −= iit .  In this case the marginal worker, who will be indifferent between acquiring skill or 
not will be given by 
1
*
+
+=
i
i
u
W
α
τδ
1
.  Observe that this is structurally the same as in equation (7), if 
we define +≡ ii αα and t ii τ≡ .   
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A.3.  One can interpret the model in the following way: Given that each worker is endowed with 
one unit of time, suppose that the training cost is given in terms of time devoted to training, iτ .  
The training cost is given by a linear function of the potential ability, t iiii δατ −= .    
Furthermore, suppose that the production function of z for any skilled worker is Z=L, where L is 
the number of skilled workers.  Thus, the productivity of any trained worker of any type is 1 unit 
of good z.  In this case, the marginal worker will be given as 
i
ii
Ui
W
α
τδ )1( −−= .  Assuming that 
iτ >1 and defining t 1−≡ ii τ , we have equation (7).  In this case, the worker with the highest 
potential ability would require the minimum amount of time on training to reach the constant 
productivity. The aggregate supply of z will be given by 
, which is the same as equation (9). ( ) =


dδαδ (
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δδαδτ
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A.4.  To see the equilibrium is socially optimal; consider a centrally planning authority that 
maximizes the aggregate utility of population in the country. 
( ) βδβ δδαδδω − −−= ∫
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Maximizing the above with respect to Uiδ , we have 
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Solving the above first order condition we have
( ) ( )
( )βα
ββααδ −
−−++=
2
222*
i
iiiii
i
ttt
Substituting 
the above into equation (6) we get the equilibrium wage in equation (12). 
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